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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on two types of 
misconduct: misreporting and shirking. I conduct a 2x2 between subjects experiment, 
manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to 
misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher 
rate and degree of misreporting, (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of 
entitlement to the incentive funds, and (3) even though misreporting occurs more with penalties, 
people shirk more in response to a bonus. Collectively, this study’s theory and results indicate 
that while penalty contracts can increase effort relative to bonus contracts, they also encourage 
greater dishonesty in reporting when that effort is not successful. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Incentive contracts represent an important tool in the design of management control 
systems to induce desirable behaviors and reduce undesirable behaviors. Incentive contracts can 
be framed as bonus contracts, where the employee is promised a wealth increase for meeting 
some target level of performance, or as penalty contracts, where the employee is threatened with 
a wealth reduction for failing to meet the target level of performance. Prior accounting research 
has focused on the effects of contract framing on effort (Christ et al. 2012; Hossain and List 
2012; Hannan et al. 2005). However, previous studies have not allowed for the opportunity to 
engage in misreporting. In reality, employees often can distort their actual performance, making 
it appear as if they have worked harder or produced more than they actually have (Maas and van 
Rinsum 2013). It is unclear from prior research which contract frame will be more likely to 
induce misreporting or how the contract frame will affect effort once employees can misreport 
instead. This study examines the effect of incentive contract framing on two specific types of 
misconduct: misreporting and shirking. Specifically, this study examines (1) whether a penalty 
framed incentive contract causes greater employee misreporting than a bonus framed incentive 
contract, (2) whether the increase occurs due to an increased sense of entitlement to the incentive 
funds, and (3) whether penalty framing will reduce shirking when misreporting is an option.  
Christ et al. (2012) note that incentive contracts usually are framed as bonus contracts but 
that interest in the use of penalty contracts has been growing in the post-SOX environment. 
Bonus contracts have been under a great deal of criticism in the past few years for creating 
incentives that encourage managers to manipulate accounting information in order to maximize 
their pay (Dehaan et al. 2013). In response, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“SOX”) requires CEOs and CFOs to return awards after a financial restatement if earned as a 
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result of misconduct, and Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) directs the SEC to craft new rules for additional clawbacks that 
go considerably further than the clawback provisions in SOX. However, many companies have 
begun voluntarily implementing penalty-based policies that go beyond the requirements of 
Section 954, choosing policies that take back compensation for a variety of reasons (e.g., failing 
to meet performance targets) and extend to employees far outside of the executive ranks (PwC 
2014, 2015; Equilar 2013). While these variations may hold the label of "clawback" in company 
documents, the PwC study notes that they may not be considered clawbacks at all but instead 
represent performance conditions of compensation.1 
While the SOX and Dodd-Frank clawback regulations are meant to deter executives from 
publishing misstated accounting information (Dehaan et al. 2013), theory exists for predicting 
that the modified versions some companies have begun implementing will likely have the 
opposite effect and ultimately induce even greater misreporting than before. Kahneman and 
Tversky's (1984) theory of loss aversion states that the disutility of giving up an object is greater 
than the utility of acquiring it. A penalty contract frames pre-penalized funds as something that 
belongs to the employee, which is likely to create a sense of entitlement to those funds even if 
the employee fails to meet the incentive contract requirements. If so, employees are likely to 
believe they are more justified in taking alternative action to retain those funds when they have 
failed to meet the requirements of the incentive contract. Accordingly, I predict that (1) 
                                                 
 
1 Typically the target funds of clawbacks have been bonuses, stock options, or other incentive awards, but industries have started 
developing new types of clawbacks to address a variety of risks (PwC 2014, 2015). 
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misreporting will be greater in response to a penalty contract and (2) the greater misreporting 
will occur due to a sense of entitlement to the incentive funds. 
Shirking represents a type of misconduct whereby an employee chooses an effort level 
below the level of effort the principal requires (Fehr and Schmidt 2007). Prior accounting 
research into the effects of contract framing on effort did not permit employees to misreport 
performance as an alternative to achieving target performance through honest effort (Christ et al. 
2012; Hossain and List 2012; Hannan et al. 2005), and it is an open question as to whether prior 
effort predictions will hold when misreporting is an option. Drawing on psychology research 
suggesting that people have a preference for honesty (Mazar et al. 2008), I predict that a penalty 
contract will affect misreporting and shirking differently. Although a penalty contract is expected 
to induce greater misreporting, I predict that a penalty contract will lead to less shirking than a 
bonus contract. 
I use a 2x2 between subjects experiment to investigate the effects of contract framing 
(Bonus/Penalty) and misreporting opportunity awareness (Before Effort/After Effort) on 
misreporting, shirking, and perceptions of entitlement to the incentive amount. I manipulate 
misreporting opportunity awareness in order to control for the possibility that the ability to 
misreport will interact with contract framing's effects on effort. If penalty framing increases 
misreporting as predicted, and people know they will be able to misreport rather than exerting 
effort on the task, it could cause them to choose misreporting instead of effort (i.e., use 
misreporting as a substitute for effort). Such substitution could eliminate or even reverse prior 
literature's findings that penalty framing causes greater effort than bonus framing (Hossain and 
List 2012; Hannan et al. 2005). I find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of 
misreporting, (2) this higher misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the 
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incentive amount, and (3) even though misreporting occurs more with penalties, people shirk less 
in response to a penalty than to a bonus, irrespective of whether they know they will have the 
opportunity to misreport instead. 
This research contributes to the management accounting literature on contract framing 
(Christ et al. 2012; Hossain and List 2012; Hannan et al. 2005; Luft 1994). It provides insight 
into potential advantages of bonus contracts over penalty contracts by revealing some costs of 
penalty contracts that would be more difficult to detect in practice. Specifically, it identifies that 
while penalty contracts can reduce shirking relative to bonus contracts, penalty contracts can also 
lead to greater dishonesty when effort is not successful. Thus penalty contracts may be 
counterproductive when increased effort does not satisfy incentive contract requirements.  
This research also contributes to the accounting literature on misreporting (e.g., Maas and 
van Rinsum 2013; Hannan, Rankin, and Towry 2006; Evans et al. 2001) by identifying the 
perception of entitlement as a mechanism for misreporting. Although the perception of 
entitlement arises from contract framing in this study, it may arise from other factors in practice, 
and thus, the results may have further implications for employee behavior beyond what is shown 
in this research.  
Finally, this research offers important practical implications for regulators and managers 
as it addresses an all too common workplace scenario where an employee is called upon to report 
his or her performance and has both the opportunity and incentive to make that performance 
appear better than what actually occurred. For example, employees at all levels may overstate 
hours worked or claims for travel or subsistence expenses, while employees in management 
positions often have discretion when reporting their unit's results and can alter depreciation 
methods, estimates of asset value, or provisions for future expenses (e.g., Bowen, Rajgopal, and 
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Venkatachalam 2008; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). Such misreporting can vary in 
egregiousness, from the subtle manipulation of various line items in the financial statements 
(e.g., earnings management) to outright falsification and fraud (Hobson, Mayew, and 
Venkatachalam 2012). When actual performance is too low to meet the threshold for gaining a 
desired incentive or avoiding an undesirable outcome, my research suggests penalty framing will 
lead to a greater tendency to fall on the dishonest side of the spectrum when reporting. However, 
my research also suggests that penalty framing will drive employees to try harder first--before 
resorting to dishonesty. This highlights the importance of setting targets that can be achieved 
through the greater exertion of effort when using penalty framing. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section II develops the hypotheses. 
Section III describes the experimental design and procedures, and Section IV presents the results. 
Section V provides conclusions.   
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CHAPTER 2: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Given the financial scandals and crises in recent years, bonus contracts have come under 
a great deal of criticism, and clawbacks have become increasingly prevalent (Dehaan et al. 
2013). The number of Fortune 100 companies disclosing some form of a clawback clause in their 
executive compensation contracts went from three to 82 percent between 2005 and 2010 
(Dehaan et al. 2013). While SOX requires CEOs and CFOs to return awards after a financial 
restatement, if earned as a result of misconduct, Dodd-Frank expands this requirement. Section 
954 of Dodd-Frank directs the SEC to craft new rules for additional clawbacks, requiring public 
companies to implement and disclose a clawback policy that takes back erroneously awarded 
incentive-based compensation paid to executive officers following accounting restatements, 
whether or not the executive officers engaged in misconduct. In response, companies have 
further implemented and modified their clawback policies in anticipation of the new SEC rules, 
which have yet to be issued. The 2014 PwC study notes that 40% of the companies reviewed 
made some type of change to their plan during 2013. 
However, the modified versions of the clawback policies that companies are using often 
go beyond the requirements of Section 954 and take back employee compensation for reasons 
other than restatements (PwC 2015). For example, some companies require employees to return 
compensation when (1) the financials are impacted even through no fault of the employee, (2) 
when the employee is perceived to have engaged in excessive risk taking, or (3) when 
performance targets/thresholds are not met. Given that most of the sampled companies are a 
Fortune 100 company and that many apply their modified clawback policies not only to 
executives but to all employees, the use of penalty contracts appears to be a growing 
phenomenon.  
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While Dodd Frank may be inadvertently leading some companies to experiment with 
penalty based contracts, in some industries such contracts are nothing new. For instance, 
contractors commonly face penalty based contract provisions in "Incentive/Disincentive" 
clauses. Disincentive provisions assess a penalty for each day the contractor overruns the time 
allotted for the completion of identified critical work (Bubshait 2003). The construction industry 
is well known for having high levels of corruption (Lurie and Burkill 2013), and it is an open 
question whether there is a causal link between the corruption and the widespread use of 
disincentive contracts. 
In spite of the above examples, bonus framing is far more commonly used in incentive 
contract design. However, penalty based incentive contracts ultimately exist for all employees as 
they can lose their jobs for failing to meet performance requirements. This is true for employees 
at all levels. For example, top management's tenures, compensation packages, and reputations 
are often determined by the extent to which their companies perform relative to analysts’ 
forecasts (Zahra, Priem, and Rasheed 2007). A survey of 1,087 board members from 286 
organizations who had removed their CEOs from office revealed that 27 percent had fired their 
organization’s CEO for tolerating low performers (Murphy 2005). This result not only highlights 
the penalty-based pressure on CEOs to meet performance targets but also the expectation that the 
CEO will apply such pressure on other employees in the organization. Penalty framing therefore 
provides a strong incentive for employees to do what they can to avoid being penalized.  
Theory suggests penalties would more effectively motivate employee effort due to loss 
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Hannan et al. (2005) and Hossain and List (2012) use 
loss aversion to predict that employees facing penalty contracts will expend greater effort to 
avoid the loss associated with the potential penalty than they will expend to gain a bonus and 
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find that lower levels of effort or productivity are a cost of bonus contracts. Fryer et al. (2012) 
show in a field study of nine K-8 Chicago Heights schools that teachers under penalty contracts 
achieve a higher performance than those under a bonus contract.2 Luft (1994) shows that while 
employees prefer contracts that are framed as bonus contracts to those framed as penalty 
contracts, penalty framing appears to lead to better performance. However, prior studies limited 
or did not investigate possible alternative means of avoiding a penalty or acquiring a bonus 
outside of increased effort. In reality, there are often options available to employees beyond 
increasing effort, options that may include undesirable behaviors such as misreporting. 
Misreporting represents a way to avoid the negative consequences of failing to achieve 
the target level of performance. As noted in Dehaan et al. (2013), performance-based 
compensation may mitigate shirking but it also encourages managers to manipulate accounting 
information in order to maximize their pay. When effort is perceived as too costly or has failed to 
produce results that would avoid a penalty or obtain a bonus, employees may resort to unethical 
means such as earnings management or fraud to avoid the negative consequences if they believe 
they can get away with it. I theorize that just as loss aversion predicts that employees will expend 
more effort under penalty contracts, it also implies employees will be more motivated to resort to 
misreporting in order to avoid a penalty than to gain a bonus when effort has failed to achieve the 
level of performance necessary to avoid the loss or gain the bonus. 
The endowment effect is based on loss aversion and suggests that one will value more an 
                                                 
 
2 Their research prompted Inc. magazine, a monthly publication focused on growing companies, to recommend that businesses 
consider using penalties to boost productivity.  
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object that one owns (Thaler 1980). A penalty contract frames pre-penalized funds as belonging 
to the employee, and inasmuch as employees attend to this aspect of contract framing, the 
endowment effect suggests pre-penalized funds will be perceived as more valuable than pre-
awarded bonus funds. Moreover, penalty framing is likely to create a sense of entitlement to 
those funds even if the employee fails to meet the incentive contract requirements.  
An entitlement reflects a psychological property right that exists independently of legal 
property rights and carries a motivational disposition to defend that perceived property right 
(Gächter and Riedl 2005; Schlicht 1998). Entitlement can be thought of as an expectation with 
normative force, i.e., an expectation that one has a right to something and should receive it 
(Major 1994; Singer 1981). While there is some overlap between the two constructs, the 
endowment effect ultimately reflects an economic valuation while entitlement reflects a 
cognitive judgment that has both affective and motivational implications (Major 1994; Lerner 
1987). For example, prior research suggests that entitlement is associated with lower pay 
satisfaction (Graham and Welbourne 1999), supervisor conflict (Harvey and Martinko 2009), 
reduced job satisfaction (King and Miles 1994), and heightened levels of turnover intentions 
(King and Miles 1994; King, Miles, and Day 1993).  
In contract framing, the psychological role of entitlement is important because a penalty 
frame has a fundamentally different conceptual base (initial ownership of incentive funds) from a 
bonus frame. Contract framing is therefore likely to cause employees to differ in the degree to 
which they feel they have a right to the incentive funds. Prior research has found that employees 
often view stealing from their employer as a morally justified source of income to which they are 
entitled (Greenberg 1993, 1990; Mars 1974, 1973). A greater sense of entitlement to the 
incentive funds is therefore likely to increase employees' comfort with using unethical means to 
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increase their income when those incentive funds are withheld. I theorize that penalty framing is 
more likely than bonus framing to engender a sense of entitlement due to the sense of ownership 
conveyed by a penalty. As a consequence, employees are likely to believe they are more justified 
in lying to protect what they perceive themselves to own than in lying to obtain something they 
do not believe they own.  
In short, penalty contract framing relies on the concept of taking back what 
psychologically has previously been added to a person’s general endowment. Inasmuch as 
people mentally lay claim to those funds and perceive them as part of their endowment, a penalty 
contract is likely to invoke a sense of entitlement to the funds being threatened by a penalty, thus 
allowing employees to believe they are more justified in engaging in misreporting. Thus, 
entitlement should at least partially mediate the effect of contract framing on misreporting. This 
leads to the following hypotheses:  
H1a: Misreporting will be greater in response to a penalty contract than to a bonus 
contract. 
H1b: The greater misreporting from a penalty contract will occur through a greater 
sense of entitlement to the incentive funds. 
Prior accounting research on the effects of contract framing on effort examined those 
effects in the absence of the opportunity to misreport (Christ et al. 2012; Hossain and List 2012; 
Hannan et al. 2005).3 In the absence of the opportunity to misreport, penalty framing was found 
                                                 
 
3 Prior literature defines shirking as exerting less effort than what is in the profit-maximizing interests of the principal (Harrison 
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to increase effort more than bonus framing in the tasks incentivized by the contract. Hannan et al. 
(2005) attributed this effect to loss aversion. However, prior research has shown that people 
sometimes use misreporting instead of effort, altering performance measures rather than altering 
the effort those measures were meant to capture (e.g., Guidry et al. 1999; Indjejikian and 
Matejka 2009; Maas and Matejka 2009). Ultimately, both effort and misreporting represent 
potential ways to avoid the negative effects of missing the target level of performance.  
When misreporting is known to be an option and is something the employee believes 
(s)he can get away with, it is no longer necessary to use effort to try to avoid the negative effects 
of missing the target level of performance. Inasmuch as people view misreporting as a lower cost 
alternative to effort, they should reduce the portion of their effort that is driven by the desire to 
avoid a penalty or gain a bonus. As a consequence, contract framing should no longer affect 
effort through loss aversion. However, because people have a preference for honesty (Mazar et 
al. 2008), they are likely to have some preference to try to meet the target level of performance 
through effort before resorting to misreporting. Thus, to the extent that people are trying to rely 
on effort rather than dishonesty, effort should still be driven by the desire to avoid a penalty or 
gain a bonus. Loss aversion and prior research suggest that penalty framing will motivate greater 
effort than bonus framing. 
In short, the effort decision is made under a different set of information than the 
misreporting decision. When choosing effort, employees do not know if their effort will be 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
and Harrell 1994; Rutledge and Karim 1999) or exerting less effort than the customary amount of effort for one's job (Shapiro 
and Stiglitz 1984).  
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sufficient to meet the target level of performance. However, because they have a preference for 
honesty, they are likely to still be motivated to try. Therefore, while penalty contracts may 
ultimately increase misconduct in the form of misreporting, penalty contracts are less likely than 
bonus contracts to result in misconduct in the form of shirking, irrespective of awareness of the 
opportunity to misreport. This leads to the following prediction: 
H2: Shirking will be lower in response to a penalty contract than to a bonus contract.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
3.1. Participants 
I recruited 99 undergraduate business students from upper-level business classes of a 
large state university to participate in one of nine 30-minute experimental sessions. The number 
of participants in each session varied in size from 3 to 27 students; as the treatments were 
randomly assigned per participant rather than per session, any session effects should be randomly 
distributed across conditions and thus not bias results. Of the 99 participants, 52 (52.5%) were 
male and 47 (47.5%) were female. Participation in the experiment took about 30 minutes on 
average and earnings ranged from $10 to $15. 
3.2. Research Design 
The experiment uses a 2x2 between subjects experiment to investigate the effects of 
contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and misreporting opportunity awareness (Aware Before 
Effort/Aware After Effort) on misreporting likelihood, dishonesty, shirking, and perceptions of 
entitlement to the incentive amount. The experiment was conducted in a computer laboratory 
using Qualtrics software, which randomly assigned each participant to one of the four treatments. 
All experimental materials were administered via computer, and between each computer was a 
divider for privacy. 
Participants read instructions, went through a short practice task, viewed their 
compensation contract, received information about effort options, performed the official task 
(Official Round), viewed and reported their scores, and answered a post-experimental 
questionnaire. The Official Round involved answering a total of 30 difficult multiple-choice 
questions from each of the following categories: critical reasoning, sentence completion, and 
sentence correction. Participants had up to 15 minutes to complete the task, after which they 
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were informed of how many questions they had answered correctly. They were then asked to 
report the number of correct answers. Their payoff was determined by the number they reported, 
not by the actual number of correct answers. Prior to the task, participants completed a short 
practice test with 3 sample questions of comparable difficulty to the official task; the practice test 
results were shown to them but they were not asked to report their practice score and their 
practice score did not affect their pay. No deception of any kind was used and participants were 
debriefed at the end of the experiment to ensure the experiment would not inadvertently lead 
them to believe misreporting is ethical. 
3.2.1. Contract Framing 
Consistent with Christ et al. (2012) and Hannan et al. (2005), I manipulate contract 
framing as either (1) a positively framed contract that rewards agents for meeting performance 
targets with a bonus payment (Bonus), or (2) a negatively framed contract that penalizes agents 
for missing the target (Penalty). Specifically, participants in the two conditions were told the 
following: 
Bonus: "You will be paid a salary of $10 for your work in this experiment. In addition, 
you will receive a $5 BONUS if your score shows you answered at least 25 of the 30 
questions correctly in the Official Round." 
Penalty: "You will be paid a salary of $15 for your work in this experiment. However, 
you will be charged a $5 PENALTY if your score does not show you answered at least 
25 of the 30 questions correctly in the Official Round." 
The contracts are monetarily equivalent, as under both contracts the employees will 
receive $15 if they reach the target score of 25 and $10 if not. In order to prevent differences in 
misreporting between treatments from being driven by differing levels of effort having 
 15 
differentially affected the opportunity to misreport, I chose a target score that was too 
challenging for most to achieve in the time allotted. I analyze data only for participants who 
failed to achieve the target score.  
3.2.2. Misreporting Opportunity Awareness 
I manipulate misreporting opportunity awareness in order to provide evidence that loss 
aversion is insufficient to explain the effects of contract framing on effort and that penalty 
framing carries psychological messages that drive misreporting and shirking in opposite 
directions. Also, by preventing misreporting from being used as a substitute for effort in one 
condition, I am able to observe any changes in how contract framing affects effort when 
misreporting can be used as an alternative to effort. In so doing, I maintain an environment 
similar to prior research into the effects of contract framing on effort, which allows for greater 
comparison between the effects found in this study and the effects found in prior literature.  
All participants had the option to misreport. After they completed the Official Round, 
participants were shown how many questions they asked correctly and all treatments viewed the 
following: "The previous number represents your actual score for this period. However, your pay 
will be calculated based only on the score you report. If you choose to lie about your score, you 
will not be caught. However, you will have to live with the knowledge that you chose to lie." 
Similar to Maas and van Rinsum (2013), which also examined misreporting, it was important to 
have an experimental setup where participants were aware that overstating their performance was 
possible but not completely appropriate within “the rules of the game.”  
I manipulate misreporting opportunity awareness by informing half the participants prior 
to the task that they will be able to lie. Specifically, participants in the two conditions were told 
the following just before the Official Round: 
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Aware Before Effort: "At the end of the official round, the computer will tell you how 
many questions you answered correctly. You will then be asked to report your score. 
Your pay will be calculated based only on the score you report. If you lie about your 
score, you will not be caught."4 
Aware After Effort: "At the end of the official round, the computer will tell you how 
many questions you answered correctly." 
3.2.3. Dependent Variable: Misreporting 
The dependent variable of misreporting is measured both in likelihood and degree. 
Misreporting likelihood is coded as 1 if the reported score differed from the actual score and 0 if 
the reported score matched the actual score. Dishonesty measures the extent to which 
participants overstated their performance, taking into account their actual scores. It is calculated 
as (Reported Score - Actual Score) / (30 – Actual Score) and represents the percentage of the 
available room for overstatement that is actually used. This dependent variable is included to 
improve comparability with prior research in this area (e.g., Evans et al. 2001; Maas and van 
Rinsum 2013).  
3.2.4. Dependent Variable: Shirking 
Immediately before the official round task, participants were told they would have up to 
15 minutes to answer the questions but that they could click submit at any point, whether they 
had answered the questions or not, to proceed to the next stage of the experiment. The potential 
                                                 
 
4 Participants were informed at the beginning of the experiment that their decisions in the experiment would be viewed by 
researchers but only as anonymous data that could not be tied to their actual identity.  
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advantages and disadvantages were pointed out to them as follows: "If you spend more time on 
the questions, it may help you answer more questions correctly.  If you spend less time on the 
questions, you will be able to complete the experiment more quickly and you can leave sooner." 
The dependent variable of shirking is measured as the maximum amount of time a participant 
could have spent on the official round task minus the actual amount of time spent on the task.5 
3.3. Generalizability  
 Although the experimental setting should not attempt to capture all of the variation in 
the naturally occurring environment (i.e., mundane realism), it should sufficiently recreate the 
pertinent elements of the settings to which the results are meant to generalize (Brunner, McKee, 
and Santore 2008). To that end, the following list represents the key aspects of the real world 
necessary to recreate for this study. 
3.3.1. Motivation and opportunity  
There must be an incentive tied to meeting a threshold (to make it attractive to lie), the 
participant's performance must fail to meet that threshold (to make the participant need to lie to 
get the incentive), and participants must have the opportunity to get away with the lie (to make 
the lie have a positive expected value). My operationalization guarantees participants can get 
away with the lie, which goes further than most opportunities that would exist in reality, where 
there would usually be some risk of getting caught. However, the risk of being caught is not 
necessary to specifically include in this experiment, as it should simply exert a unilateral 
                                                 
 
5 The maximum time allowed for the task was set at 15 minutes, which was just barely sufficient to read through the questions 
and answer them, but it did not allow much time for thinking through the questions carefully.  
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downward pressure on misreporting for both bonus and penalty framing. As my research is 
interested in the directional differences between bonus and penalty framing, the inclusion of an 
additional cost of misreporting is unnecessary and would simply reduce the expected value of 
misreporting. As the expected value is already quite small ($5) and far less than values that cause 
misreporting in reality, a further reduction would be more likely to reduce generalizability rather 
than enhance it. Moreover, the removal of any economic cost of misreporting allows me to 
observe whether loss aversion sufficiently explains the effects of contract framing (see earlier 
discussion for hypothesis development of H2).  
3.3.2. Responsibility for outcome 
The task must be one over which the participant can influence the outcome. This is 
necessary as people are generally considered undeserving of both positive and negative outcomes 
for which they are not responsible (Feather, 1999). A lack of feeling any responsibility for the 
outcome could drive feelings of entitlement under a penalty (as participants would not feel they 
deserved the penalty) while creating a sense of luck under a bonus (as participants would 
likewise not feel they deserved the bonus). Preserving some measure of participant responsibility 
for the outcome biases against my results. 
3.3.3. Misreporting cannot be a game 
The environment must be one in which lying is not simply part of a game where it has 
lost its moral connotations. This is necessary in order to have confidence that misreporting 
decisions follow the same underlying mechanisms that would be in effect outside the 
experimental setting. My operationalization helps ensure this by utilizing a context highly 
appropriate for the participant pool: a test. Students are accustomed to taking tests and know the 
'rules' involved, so a decision to misreport a test score was less likely to be perceived as a game. 
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Moreover, my design made the moral cost of lying salient by pointing out that they would have 
to "live with the fact" that they had lied. Free responses in the post experimental questionnaire 
indicate participants saw the decision to lie or be honest about their score as a moral dilemma. In 
fact, 71 of the 98 participants who failed to achieve the target score were honest in the 
experiment. Of the 27 participants who lied, most pointed to either the test difficulty or the 
monetary benefit as their reason for lying.6 Participant responses are shown in Appendix C. 
  
                                                 
 
6 When asked why they had chosen to overstate their score, one participant stated, "because it appeared you wanted me to." No 
analyses were significantly affected by removing that participant from analyses. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
4.1. Preliminary Analysis 
After eliminating the only participant whose actual score was high enough to not need to 
misreport, I had 98 usable observations. Data acquired through the post-experimental 
questionnaire indicate that, on average, participants participated seriously, found the task 
interesting and challenging, found the target goal fair, and were motivated to perform well. 
Manipulation checks (not tabulated) confirm that both manipulations were successful. The 
manipulation of the impact of contract framing was checked with the following, where (a) is 
coded as 1 and (b) is coded as 0:  
Please choose the answer that BEST represents your compensation structure: 
(a) If I reported scoring less than the target score of 25, I would be penalized by $5 
(b) If I reported scoring at least the target score of 25, I would receive a bonus of $5. 
The mean score option (a) is higher in the Penalty conditions (.82, SD = 0.39) than in the 
Bonus conditions (.14, SD = 0.35). The manipulation of misreporting opportunity awareness was 
checked with the following, where (a) is coded as 1 and (b) as 0: 
Please choose the answer that BEST represents your situation: 
(a) I knew about the option to overstate my score BEFORE I answered the official round 
questions. 
(b) I didn't know about the option to overstate my score until AFTER I answered the 
official round questions. 
The mean score option (a) is higher in the Before conditions (.43, SD = 0.5) than in the 
After conditions (.14, SD = 0.35). In both cases the difference is significant (p < 0.001), 
confirming the manipulations were successful. Overall, 83% of participants passed the contract 
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framing manipulation check while 64% passed the awareness timing manipulation check. The 
lower pass rate for the awareness timing manipulation is likely due to the subtlety with which the 
information was presented. Information about the opportunity to misreport was not highlighted 
or otherwise made unusually salient to avoid demand effects.   
The distribution of male and female participants across conditions is fairly even (not 
tabulated). The percentage of female participants ranges from 40% (in the Bonus/Before 
condition) to 56% (in the Penalty/After condition). A chi-square test indicates that the proportion 
of female participants does not vary significantly between conditions (χ2 = 1.37, p = 0.504).  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics regarding performance as measured by Actual 
Score, Reported Score, and Shirking. On average, participants answered 28.59 questions (SD = 
2.67) and skipped 1.41 (SD = 2.67) questions. The value of Actual Score varies between 5 and 
23 with a mean of 14.82 (SD = 4.35). The value of Reported Score varies from 5 to the 
maximum of 30 with a mean of 17.79 (SD = 6.50). Shirking is measured as the maximum 
amount of time a participant was able to spend on the official task minus the actual time spent on 
the task, where time is measured as the seconds from participants' first moment on the task page 
until they either clicked submit or their time ran out. Values ranged from 0 to 651.5 seconds 
from a possible 0 to 904.9 seconds.7  
Tables 3 and 4 tabulate misreporting tendencies. The variable Misreporting Likelihood 
measures whether participants overstated their score or not. It is coded as a 1 if they misreported 
                                                 
 
7 The maximum time for the task was set at 900 seconds, but the programming picked up a slight delay in loading the next screen. 
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and a 0 otherwise and captures the proportion of participants who misreported their score. The 
mean value of Misreporting Likelihood is 27.6%. The lowest mean is found in the Bonus/Before 
condition (Mean = .12, SD = .33) and the highest in the Penalty/After condition (Mean = .40, SD 
= .50). The variable Dishonesty measures the extent to which participants overstated their 
performance, taking into account their actual scores (see Table 4). It is calculated as (Reported 
Score - Actual Score) / (30 – Actual Score) and represents the percentage of the available room 
for overstatement that is actually used. This dependent variable improves comparability with 
prior research in this area (e.g., Evans et al. 2001; Maas and van Rinsum 2013). The mean value 
of Dishonesty is 19.5%. The lowest mean is found in the Bonus/Before condition (Mean = .095, 
SD = .27) and the highest in the Penalty/After condition (Mean = .284, SD = .38). There is 
considerable variation across conditions in the mean value of each of the above misreporting 
variables. 
4.2. Tests of Hypotheses: H1 
H1a predicts that misreporting will be greater in response to a penalty contract than to a 
bonus contract. To test H1a, I run a full factorial model with the two manipulations as fixed 
factors and Misreporting Likelihood and Dishonesty as the dependent variables (each tested 
separately).8 The results are displayed in Tables 3 and 4 and indicate a main effect of contract 
framing for all three variables and no significant effect of either misreporting opportunity 
awareness or the interaction. The main effect of contract framing is significant in the predicted 
                                                 
 
8 Results remain significant when actual score is included as a covariate; actual score is not a significant predictor of any of the 
three misreporting variables.
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direction, with a one-tailed p-value of <.03 for all three dependent variables, providing strong 
support for H1a.  
In addition, because prior research has often found a gender effect on misreporting (e.g., 
Maas and van Rinsum 2013; Croson and Gneezy 2009), I regressed each misreporting variable 
on gender as well.  I do not find evidence that women misreport less than men (p-value > .67 for 
each misreporting variable). I also test for possible interaction effects of gender and the 
independent variables, running an ANCOVA with gender as a third factor for all three 
misreporting dependent variables. The results (not tabulated) indicate that neither the three-way 
interactions, nor any of the two-way interactions, are significant, while the main effect of 
contract framing remains significant for each misreporting variable. This finding indicates that 
both women and men are similarly affected by contract framing when deciding whether to 
misreport their performance. 
H1b predicts that the greater misreporting from a penalty contract will be accompanied 
by a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds. The theoretical reasoning underpinning 
H1b maintains that a penalty frames pre-penalized funds as belonging to the employee, thus 
creating a sense of entitlement to those funds regardless of whether the employee meets the 
target goal. This greater level of entitlement, in turn, leads to a greater level of misreporting.  
To test H1b, I conduct additional analyses to verify the mediating mechanism underlying 
the contract framing effect documented above. I use the following two statements in the post-
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experimental questionnaire to capture perceptions of entitlement:9 
1. I deserved to receive the full $15 in this experiment. 
2. I feel entitled to the full $15 in this experiment. 
Participants’ responses to these two statements were elicited on a 6-point Likert scale 
with “1” labeled “strongly disagree” and “6” labeled “strongly agree.” As shown in Table 6, 
Panel B, these two items (item 5 and item 6 on the post-experimental questionnaire) load on the 
same factor in the factor analysis. Table 7 summarizes the participants’ average responses to 
these statements by condition. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the two statements is .8385, indicating 
good internal consistency of the two statements. Accordingly, I base the analyses in this section 
on the average of the two items. 
To formally test the mediating effect of entitlement, the following four conditions must 
be established: (1) misreporting is significantly greater in response to a penalty contract than to a 
bonus contract, (2) entitlement is significantly greater in response to a penalty contract than to a 
bonus contract, (3) entitlement significantly increases misreporting when controlling for the 
effects of the manipulated variables, and (4) the effect of contract framing on misreporting is 
reduced to zero for full mediation or partially reduced for partial mediation (MacKinnon et al. 
2002; Baron and Kenny 1986).10 
The first condition establishes that there is an effect that may be mediated. This effect is 
                                                 
 
9 The two questions were adapted from the Psychological Entitlement Scale (PES). While the PES captures entitlement related to 
one's personality rather than to external circumstances, it relies primarily on two words: "deserve" and "entitlement." I modified 
the form of the questions to attempt to capture the relevant aspects of entitlement for this study. 
10 See also David A. Kenny’s mediation website for a helpful discussion (http://davidakenny.net/cm/mediate.htm). 
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established in the test of H1a, which shows that misreporting will be greater in response to a 
penalty contract than to a bonus contract (see Tables 3 and 4). The second condition establishes 
that the manipulation of interest significantly affects entitlement in the predicted direction. To 
test this, I run a full factorial model with the two manipulations as fixed factors and entitlement 
as the dependent variable. The results are displayed in Table 8, Panel A and indicate a main 
effect of contract framing on entitlement in the predicted direction, with a one-tailed p-value of 
.0218. This satisfies the second condition. 
The third and fourth conditions are tested in a single model. I run a full factorial model 
with the two manipulations as fixed factors, Entitlement as a covariate, and Misreporting 
Likelihood and Dishonesty as the dependent variables (with each DV again tested separately). 
The results are displayed in Table 8, Panels B and C and show that entitlement significantly 
increases misreporting when controlling for the effects of the manipulated variables. This 
establishes condition 3. The coefficient estimates for contract framing show a negative 
relationship between the Bonus condition and misreporting; the coefficients decreased in 
absolute value from -.0901 to -.0694 for Misreporting Likelihood and from -.0746 to -.0549 for 
Dishonesty after the mediator was added to the model. Notably, contract framing loses 
significance once Entitlement is added to the models. Collectively, these results provide strong 
support for the theoretical argument that entitlement at least partially mediates the effect of 
contract framing on misreporting. H1b is therefore supported. 
To provide additional support for the theory that penalty framing is likely to create a 
sense of ownership to the incentive funds, I asked participants who did not receive the incentive 
if they believed their money had been stolen and participants who had received the incentive if 
they believed their money would have been stolen if they had not misreported (Table 6, Panel A, 
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Item 7). Participants agreed more often in response to penalty framing than bonus framing 
(p=.0910 two tailed). This indicates that penalty framing creates a greater sense of ownership to 
the funds being threatened by a penalty than bonus framing creates to the funds offered as a 
bonus. It also indicates penalty framing creates a greater sense that the principal is violating the 
employee's rights when denying the employee the incentive funds. Untabulated analyses reveal 
that Entitlement fully mediates the effect of contract framing on the degree to which participants 
feel their money was stolen or would have been stolen. Contract framing loses significance once 
Entitlement is added to the model (contract framing p-value goes from .0927 to .3927, two-
tailed; Entitlement p-value < .0001, two-tailed). Moreover, Money Stolen also mediates the effect 
of contract framing on Misreporting Likelihood and Dishonesty (Money Stolen p-values < .0002, 
two tailed; contract framing two-tailed p-values = .15 and .11 respectively). This suggests 
penalty framing increases entitlement to the incentive funds, which in turn increases the degree 
to which people perceive the withholding of those incentive funds as a violation of their rights, 
which in turn increases their tendency to use dishonest means of obtaining the incentive funds. 
This provides strong support for the theoretical reasoning underpinning H1b. 
4.3. Tests of Hypotheses: H2 
H2 predicts that shirking will be lower in response to a penalty. To test H2, I run a full 
factorial model with the two manipulations as fixed factors and Shirking (total seconds possible 
on task - total seconds spent on task) as the dependent variable. The results are displayed in 
Table 5, Panel A and show no evidence of the predicted main effect of contract framing on 
shirking. Further analyses (not tabulated) also reveal no main effect of contract framing on 
Actual Score. Another potential measure of shirking comes from participants' self-reported effort 
level. In the post-experimental questionnaire, participants were asked the degree to which they 
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agreed with the following statement: "I tried my hardest in this experiment" (see Table 6, Panel 
A, Q13). Running the model with this response as the dependent variable (not tabulated) again 
shows no indication of an effect of contract framing (p-value > .45).  
Some of the additional data gathered offer insight into the seeming lack of effect. Many 
participants had taken a required business ethics course prior to the experiment.11 Running a 
2x2x2 with participation in the ethics course as an IV reveals that participants who had not yet 
taken the ethics course responded to contract framing as predicted by H2 and shirked more 
response to a bonus contract than to a penalty contract (Shirking one-tailed p-value = .015 simple 
effect).12 However, participants who had already taken the ethics course exerted a high level of 
effort regardless of contract frame (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics). In fact, there was a 
general main effect where those who had taken the ethics class spent more time on the task and 
performed better than those who had not taken the class when measured by Shirking (one-tailed 
p-value < .03, Table 5, Panel B), Self-Reported Effort (one-tailed p-value < .03, not tabulated), 
and Actual Score (one-tailed p-value < .01, not tabulated). In each of these measures, those who 
had taken the ethics course showed no sensitivity to contract frame (p-values > .80 for simple 
effects of contract frame).  
Collectively, these additional analyses suggest penalty contracts reduce shirking as 
predicted by H2. The analyses also reveal a reassuring finding indicating that business ethics 
                                                 
 
11 Approximately 64% of participants had taken the ethics course. These participants were distributed fairly evenly across 
conditions. 
12 Participants who did not take the ethics course were evenly distributed across the four treatments (7, 10, 10, 8) with 17 and 18 
in Bonus and Penalty conditions respectively.  
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courses may have the ability to improve students' ethical behavior. It is interesting to note, 
however, that while the ethics course participants shirked less, their misreporting did not differ 
from those who had not taken the course. Further research is needed to parse out the differences 
between the two groups to understand why ethics training appears to have been effective in 
instilling a strong work ethic but not honesty.  
4.4. Supplemental Analyses 
To shed light on the process underlying individuals’ misreporting and shirking decisions, 
I conduct additional analyses of the post-experimental questions collected. I then conduct 
mediation analyses to examine how the treatments influence these constructs and how these 
constructs influence participants’ misreporting and shirking decisions. Table 6, panel A presents 
the descriptive statistics of participants’ responses to the post-experimental questionnaire items 
by condition. Table 6, panel B presents the results of the factor analysis of the post-experimental 
questionnaire items. The factor analysis extracts five factors, accounting for 72.43 percent of the 
total variance in the data. I eliminate questions with factor loadings below 0.7 (Comrey and Lee 
1992).  
Items 11 and 12 load on Factor 1, Fairness, and reflect the fairness with which 
participants feel they were treated in the experiment. Items 5 and 6 load on Factor 2, Entitlement, 
and reflect how entitled participants feel to the incentive funds. Items 3 and 4 load on Factor 3, 
Ethics of Own Behavior, and reflect how honest and ethical participants perceive themselves to 
have been in the experiment. Item 2 loads on Factor 4, Work Ethic, and reflects how important 
participants believe it is to work hard. Items 8 and 9 load on Factor 5, Goal Achievability, and 
reflect how reasonable participants believed the target score to be. I use the average of 
participants’ responses to the questions that load on each factor for the analyses. 
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The supplemental analyses show that, among the factors extracted from the factor 
analysis, the only construct that is influenced by the treatments and also influences misreporting 
is the entitlement construct. These results provide further evidence that misreporting is driven by 
entitlement rather than by other mechanisms. I elaborate on the findings from these supplemental 
analyses below. 
Factor 1 (Fairness): consistent with prior literature, I find that participants view bonus 
contract framing as more fair than penalty contract framing (mean of 4.87 for Bonus versus 4.38 
Penalty, p = .06, two-tailed). These results could indicate a reciprocity story, where participants 
reciprocate with either positive or negative behavior. However, results show that participants 
thought they were treated well and fairly in both penalty and bonus treatments, providing 
evidence against a negative reciprocity story, as there is no negative event perception to which 
they would respond by 'getting back at' the principal. A positive reciprocity story would mean 
those in the bonus conditions would be more likely to respond with positive behavior (e.g., apply 
themselves more to the task). However, bonus participants shirked more while penalty 
participants worked harder, which is the opposite of what would be expected for a reciprocity 
story. Furthermore, Fairness did not predict shirking, misreporting likelihood, or dishonesty 
when added to the 2x2 model (Contract Framing x Awareness Timing) as well as when 
partitioning based on ethics course participation. These results suggest that neither fairness nor 
reciprocity drives my results. 
Factor 2 (Entitlement): as noted in the main results, Entitlement mediates the effect of 
contract framing on misreporting. However, one possibility is that the effect of penalty framing 
on Entitlement comes from penalty framing inducing greater effort than bonus framing; 
expending greater effort could cause people to feel more entitled to incentive pay even when 
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they failed to meet the target level of performance (Gravert 2013). Adding Shirking to the 2x2 
model predicting entitlement reveals no effect of effort on entitlement (p = .35, two-tailed). 
Likewise, adding Shirking to the 2x2 model predicting misreporting likelihood and dishonesty 
again reveals no effect of effort (p = .36 and .18 respectively, two-tailed). This non-result held 
even when the sample was partitioned based on ethics course participation. These results suggest 
that effort based entitlement does not drive my results. 
Factor 3 (Ethics of Own Behavior): I find that participants view themselves as more 
honest and ethical under bonus contract framing than penalty contract framing (mean of 5.12 for 
Bonus versus 4.49 Penalty, p = .0457, two-tailed). Given that participants lied more in response 
to a penalty contract, this effect could simply come from the fact that participants were more 
honest under a bonus contract. However, after controlling for differences in misreporting, the 
effect still stands: when people lie under a bonus, they think they are more honest and ethical 
than when they lie under a penalty (mean of 3.13 for Bonus versus 2.39 Penalty, p = .0480 
simple effect, two-tailed). Prior research has shown people are more likely to excuse others for 
misconduct that occurs to avoid a penalty than to gain a bonus (Greitemeyer and Weiner 2008). 
If lying under a bonus is less excusable, it makes sense that people would feel a greater need to 
downplay the lie under a bonus than a penalty in order to justify the dishonest actions taken to 
gain the bonus or avoid the penalty.  
This need for additional justification could also explain the lower misreporting in 
response to a bonus, where lying in response to a bonus is perceived as more wrong than lying in 
response to a penalty. Item 1 did not load on any factor but measures the extent to which 
participants believe overstating performance is wrong. Collapsing Misreporting Opportunity 
Awareness across conditions and analyzing a 2x2 of Contract Framing x Misreporting 
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Likelihood shows participants who lied were more likely to agree overstating is wrong in 
response to a penalty (mean of 4.56 for Penalty versus 3.67 Bonus among those who lied, p = .04 
simple effect, two-tailed).13 However, participants who were honest saw overstating as equally 
wrong across bonus and penalty conditions (mean of 5.06 for Penalty versus 5.03 Bonus, p = .88 
simple effect, two-tailed). This is consistent with a self-justification story. However, while 
adding Item 1 to the main 2x2 model shows that participants' belief about overstating wrongness 
is a significant covariate, it does not mediate the effect of Contract Framing. Instead, Contract 
Framing becomes even more significant (p-value goes from .0287 to .0153, two tailed, for 
Dishonesty) and the effect size increases (-.0908 to -.0973). Thus, the need for additional 
justification does not drive my results. 
Factor 4 (Work Ethic) is comprised solely of Item 2. Using Factor 4 in the analysis of 
misreporting reveals that Work Ethic does not influence misreporting likelihood or dishonesty 
after controlling for my treatments. Thus, Factor 4 does not drive my results for H1.  
Factor 5 (Goal Achievability) reflects the achievability of the target level of performance. 
My treatments do not affect Goal Achievability nor does Goal Achievability predict misreporting 
likelihood or dishonesty after controlling for the effects of my treatments. Adding Goal 
Achievability to the 2x2x2 ethics participant model predicting shirking reveals that it is a 
significant covariate. However, there is no evidence that achievability mediates the effect of 
framing on shirking, as framing becomes even more significant when achievability is added to 
                                                 
 
13 Item 1 did not vary according to Misreporting Opportunity Awareness so I collapsed across conditions for simplicity of 
analysis. Results are quantitatively and qualitatively comparable running a full 2x2x2. 
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the model. Therefore achievability does not drive results for either H1 or H2. 
Overall, these additional analyses help rule out potential alternative explanations for the 
mechanisms behind the effects of Contract Framing on misconduct. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
Many organizations’ control systems contain performance measures that can be 
manipulated (Maas and van Rinsum 2013). Misreporting represents an ongoing area of concern 
for organizations and an important topic in management accounting research. The results of this 
study suggest that the framing of the incentive contract influences misconduct in different ways 
depending on the type of misconduct considered. First, misreporting is higher in response to a 
penalty contract. Next, the higher misreporting in response to a penalty occurs due to a greater 
sense of entitlement to the incentive amount. Finally, people shirk less in response to a penalty 
than to a bonus, regardless of whether or not they know misreporting is an option. This research 
contributes to the literature on honesty in performance reporting (e.g., Maas and van Rinsum 
2013; Rankin et al. 2008; Hannan, Rankin, Towry, et al. 2006; Evans et al. 2001) by examining 
the effects of contract framing on honesty. It also contributes to the literature on the effects of 
contract framing (Christ et al. 2012; Hossain and List 2012; Hannan et al. 2005; Luft 1994) by 
exploring the link between effort and misreporting and identifying underlying mechanisms 
through which contract framing influences misconduct.  
Collectively the results indicate that while penalty contracts may reduce shirking relative 
to bonus contracts, penalty contracts also promote greater dishonesty when effort is not 
successful. Thus penalty contracts may be counterproductive when effort is not a strong predictor 
of performance or when the performance target is set at a very challenging level. My results 
suggest that companies should be aware of the potential undesirable consequences of using 
bonus or penalty framing and should design complementary control elements accordingly. For 
example, when companies use bonuses, their controls should focus on increasing effort. When 
companies use penalties, their controls should focus on reducing dishonesty. Insights from this 
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study can help managers and auditors identify and manage the risks created by incentive 
contracts by providing a better roadmap to use when looking for potential weaknesses. 
Moreover, this study sheds light on some potential pitfalls of the modified clawback schemes 
many companies are implementing and may provide guidance to regulators as they consider how 
best to word their requirements for Section 954 of Dodd-Frank. Ultimately, misreporting is not 
simply a product of increased yet unfruitful effort but comes from a sense of entitlement created 
by the contract frame itself. To the extent that a sense of entitlement can be created by other 
factors as well, the results of this study may have implications for employee behavior beyond 
what is shown in this research. 
A limitation of this study is that it consists of a single shot experiment. In a repeated trial 
experiment, the effects of contract framing could change, depending on whether the target level 
of performance is repeatedly missed. Over time, the increased effort from a penalty may 
evaporate in an environment where the target level of performance is repeatedly missed and a 
penalty (or not receiving a bonus) is the rule and not the exception. Moreover, lying may become 
more and more acceptable, undermining desirable ethical norms in the organization. Future 
research is needed to examine the cumulative effects of using bonus versus penalty framing to 
motivate performance. 
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APPENDIX A: TABLES 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Performance 
 
 
Mean (Standard Deviation) Actual Score a  
  Aware Before Effort   
Aware After 
Effort 
Bonus for Achieving Target 
14.84  14.92 
(4.51)  (4.77) 
n=25  n=24 
    
Penalty for not Achieving Target 
14.46  15.04 
(3.73)  (4.57) 
n=24  n=25 
     
Mean (Standard Deviation) Reported Score b 
  Aware Before Effort   
Aware After 
Effort 
Bonus for Achieving Target 
16.52  16.92 
(5.87)  (6.44) 
n=25  n=24 
    
Penalty for not Achieving Target 
18.33  19.36 
(6.84)  (6.79) 
n=24  n=25 
     
Mean (Standard Deviation) Shirking c 
  Aware Before Effort   
Aware After 
Effort 
Bonus for Achieving Target 
78.84  49.01 
(178.3)  (76.1) 
n=25  n=24 
    
Penalty for not Achieving Target 
51.46  50.10 
(81.4)  (88.3) 
n=24  n=25  
 
a Actual score is the score earned in the official task; scores ranged from 5 to 23 out of a possible 0 to 30. 
b Reported score is the score earned in the official task; scores ranged from 5 to 30 out of a possible 0 to 30. 
c  Shirking is the maximum amount of time a participant was able to spend on the official task minus the actual time 
spent on the task, where time is measured as the seconds from participants' first moment on the task page until they 
either clicked submit or their time ran out. Shirking values ranged from 0 to 651.5 seconds. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Shirking by Ethics Course Participation 
 
 
Ethics Course Participants 
 
Mean (Standard Deviation) Shirking a 
  Aware Before Effort   
Aware After 
Effort 
Bonus for Achieving Target 
33.31  28.51 
(58.77)  (42.89) 
n=15  n=17 
    
Penalty for not Achieving Target 
61.29  38.24 
(85.18)  (65.10) 
n=16  n=15 
     
Ethics Course Non-Participants 
 
Mean (Standard Deviation) Shirking a  
  Aware Before Effort   
Aware After 
Effort 
Bonus for Achieving Target 
147.13  98.79 
(266.06)  (114.92) 
n=10  n=7 
    
Penalty for not Achieving Target 
31.82  67.88 
(74.43)  (116.71) 
n=8  n=10 
     
a Shirking is the maximum amount of time a participant was able to spend on the official task minus the actual time 
spent on the task, where time is measured as the seconds from participants' first moment on the task page until they 
either clicked submit or their time ran out. Shirking values ranged from 0 to 651.5 seconds.  
 42 
TABLE 3 
The Effects of Contract Framing and Misreporting Opportunity Awareness on Misreporting 
Likelihood 
 
Panel A: Frequency (Percentage) of Misreporting Likelihood a 
 
 Aware Before Effort Aware After Effort 
   
Bonus for Achieving Target  
 
3 (12%) 
(n = 25) 
 
6 (25%) 
(n = 24) 
Penalty for not Achieving Target 8 (33%)  
(n = 24) 
10 (40%)  
(n = 25) 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance† 
Factor  Df  
Mean 
Square  F  
 
p-value b 
         
CONTRACT FRAMING c  1  .8082  4.11  0.0454 
MISREPORTING OPPORTUNITY 
AWARENESS d 
 1  .2368  1.21  0.2751 
CONTRACT FRAMING x 
MISREPORTING OPPORTUNITY 
AWARENESS 
 1  .0246  0.13  0.7245 
Error  97       
 
a Misreporting Likelihood is the participant’s decision to misreport his/her score, which is coded as 1 if a participant 
reports a score higher than the score they actually achieved, and 0 otherwise. Percentage of Misreporting Likelihood 
is the number of participants who misreported divided by the total number of participants in each treatment.  
b All p-values in this Table are two-tailed.  
c Contract Framing was manipulated between subjects at two levels. Participants were either promised a bonus for 
scoring greater than or equal to 25 or threatened with a penalty for scoring less than 25. 
d Misreporting Opportunity Awareness was manipulated between subjects at two levels. All participants were told, 
"At the end of the official round, the computer will tell you how many questions you answered correctly." The 
Aware Before Effort participants were further told, "You will then be asked to report your score. Your pay will be 
calculated based only on the score you report. If you lie about your score, you will not be caught." The Aware After 
Effort participants were told this as well but only after they had completed the official round task. 
† An ANOVA is used here for ease of interpretation. When the more appropriate logistic regression is used to test 
the binary dependent variable, the significance of Contract Framing results in an Effect Likelihood Ratio two-tailed 
p-value of .0354. 
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TABLE 4 
The Effects of Contract Framing and Misreporting Opportunity Awareness on Dishonesty 
 
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) Dishonesty a 
 
 Aware Before Effort Aware After Effort 
   
Bonus for Achieving Target  
 
.095 (.27) 
(n = 25) 
 
.145 (.28) 
(n = 24) 
Penalty for not Achieving Target .254 (.39) 
(n = 24) 
.284 (.38) 
(n = 25) 
 
Panel B: Analysis of Variance 
Factor  Df  
Mean 
Square  F  
 
p-value b 
         
CONTRACT FRAMING c  1  .5450  4.93  0.0287 
MISREPORTING OPPORTUNITY 
AWARENESS d 
 1  .0397  0.36  0.5503 
CONTRACT FRAMING x 
MISREPORTING OPPORTUNITY 
AWARENESS 
 1  .0025  0.02  0.8818 
Error  97       
 
a Dishonesty is (Reported Score - Actual Score) / (30 – Actual Score).  
b All p-values in this Table are two-tailed.  
c Contract Framing was manipulated between subjects at two levels. Participants were either promised a bonus for 
scoring greater than or equal to 25 or threatened with a penalty for scoring less than 25. 
d Misreporting Opportunity Awareness was manipulated between subjects at two levels. All participants were told, 
"At the end of the official round, the computer will tell you how many questions you answered correctly." The 
Aware Before Effort participants were further told, "You will then be asked to report your score. Your pay will be 
calculated based only on the score you report. If you lie about your score, you will not be caught." The Aware After 
Effort participants were told this as well but only after they had completed the official round task. 
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TABLE 5 
The Effects of Contract Framing and Misreporting Opportunity Awareness on  
Shirking a  
 
Panel A: Analysis of Variance 
Factor  Df  
Mean 
Square  F  
 
p-value b 
         
CONTRACT FRAMING c  1  4232.196  0.32  .5718 
MISREPORTING OPPORTUNITY 
AWARENESS d 
 1  5958.996  0.45  .5024 
FRAMING x AWARENESS   1  4961.416  0.38  .5405 
Error  97       
Panel B: Analysis of Variance 
Factor 
 
Df 
 
Mean Square 
 
F 
 
p-value b 
         
CONTRACT FRAMING  1  
16302.059  1.31  0.2562 
MISREPORTING OPPORTUNITY 
AWARENESS  1  
2228.229  0.18  0.6737 
FRAMING*AWARENESS  1  
6058.828  0.49  0.4878 
ETHICS COURSE (1=YES)  1  
46990.823  3.76  0.0555 
FRAMING*ETHICS COURSE †  1  
46826.959  3.75  0.0559 
AWARENESS*ETHICS COURSE  1  
335.581  0.03  0.8701 
FRAMING*AWARENESS*ETHICS 
COURSE  1  
14580.667  1.17  0.2827 
Error  97       
 
 
a Shirking is the maximum amount of time a participant was able to spend on the official task minus the actual time 
spent on the task, where time is measured as the seconds from participants' first moment on the task page until they 
either clicked submit or their time ran out. Shirking values ranged from 0 to 651.5 seconds. 
b All p-values in this Table are two-tailed.  
c Contract Framing was manipulated between subjects at two levels. Participants were either promised a bonus for 
scoring greater than or equal to 25 or threatened with a penalty for scoring less than 25. 
d Misreporting Opportunity Awareness was manipulated between subjects at two levels. All participants were told, 
"At the end of the official round, the computer will tell you how many questions you answered correctly." The 
Aware Before Effort participants were further told, "You will then be asked to report your score. Your pay will be 
calculated based only on the score you report. If you lie about your score, you will not be caught." The Aware After 
Effort participants were told this as well but only after they had completed the official round task. 
† Simple effects reveal a significant effect whereby participants who had not taken the ethics course exerted less 
effort in response to a bonus than to a penalty (two-tailed p-value = .0107). 
 
 45 
TABLE 6 
Descriptive Statistics and Factor Analysis of Post-Experimental Questionnaire Responses 
Panel A: Means of Post-Experimental Questionnaire Responses 
  Bonus  Penalty 
Questionnaire Items  Aware Before 
Effort 
 Aware After 
Effort 
 Aware Before 
Effort 
 Aware After 
Effort 
1. Overstating one's performance is wrong.   
4.80 
  
4.75 
  
4.88 
  
4.88 
2. Not working as hard as you can is wrong.   
4.44 
  
4.54 
  
5.00 
  
4.56 
3. My choices in this experiment were ethical.**   
5.08 
  
5.08 
 
> 
 
4.58 
  
4.25 
4. I was honest in this experiment.*   
5.08 
  
5.25 
 
> 
 
4.71 
  
4.32 
5. I deserved to receive the full $15 in this experiment.**   
3.16 
  
2.88 
 
< 
 
3.96 
  
3.56 
6. I feel entitled to the full $15 in this experiment.   
2.72 
  
2.92 
  
3.42 
  
3.20 
7. My money was stolen or would have been stolen if I 
hadn't misreported my score.** † 
  
1.92 
 
> 
 
1.29 
 
< 
 
2.29 
 
> 
 
1.68 
8. Prior to answering the questions in the Official Round, I 
believed I could achieve the target score of 25. 
  
3.20 
  
3.33 
  
3.21 
  
3.36 
9. The target score for the Official Round was fair.   
3.80 
  
3.54 
  
3.21 
  
3.52 
10. The way I expect to be paid is fair.   
4.44 
  
4.54 
  
4.46 
  
4.32 
11. I was treated fairly in this experiment.*   
4.88 
  
4.75 
 
> 
 
4.42 
  
4.28 
12. I was treated well in this experiment.*   
4.88 
  
4.96 
 
> 
 
4.38 
  
4.48 
13. I tried my hardest in this experiment.   
4.52 
  
4.54 
  
5.00 
  
4.56 
 
** two-tailed p-value < .05 for full factorial ANOVA of Contract Framing x Misreporting Opportunity Awareness  
* two-tailed p-value < .10 for full factorial ANOVA of Contract Framing x Misreporting Opportunity Awareness  
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Table 6, Panel A (Cont.) 
† This question was asked in two parts to get at the extent to which participants believed they had a right to the incentive funds; responses to "My money was 
stolen" were taken from those who did not misreport (and therefore did not get the incentive funds) while responses to "My money would have been stolen if I 
hadn't misreported my score" were taken from those who did misreport. The extent to which they agreed with each statement was aggregated into one question 
for consistency in analysis. 
 47 
Table 6 (Cont.) 
Panel B: Factor Analysis  
Items 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
1 0.0425000331 -0.20823178 0.391529121 0.6038942209 -0.027947565 
2 0.1021902808 -0.163809471 0.0056801224 0.8028132103 0.0961292284 
3 0.0890760403 -0.162358075 0.9134436261 0.0423449861 -0.032718088 
4 0.1377081799 -0.099359167 0.9250843843 -0.000927308 0.0451482492 
5 -0.051576014 0.9000546786 0.0503730063 -0.036090483 0.0864766095 
6 -0.000030338 0.8852444958 -0.15935552 -0.102487263 -0.034287928 
7 -0.117858641 0.6096866068 -0.332311332 -0.016266839 -0.082856281 
8 -0.060036115 0.1186437298 -0.139467003 0.1404821542 0.7438490911 
9 0.2576654434 -0.149856204 0.2056682073 -0.055975895 0.7196663002 
10 0.6336895495 -0.055126221 -0.013965489 0.2940365276 0.4484848269 
11 0.8910585708 -0.106557341 0.1465164805 0.2112970507 0.0988008412 
12 0.9448416901 -0.024062798 0.1313569639 0.039135231 -0.040863927 
13 0.202239709 0.1485357862 -0.113261333 0.6517708685 0.0657886382 
            
Variance Explained 17.35% 16.50% 16.12% 12.33% 10.13% 
Cumulative Percent  17.35% 33.85% 49.97% 62.30% 72.43% 
Factor Labels Fairness Entitlement Ethics of Own Behavior Work Ethic Goal Achievability 
 
** two-tailed p-value < .05 for full factorial ANOVA of Contract Framing x Misreporting Opportunity Awareness  
* two-tailed p-value < .10 for full factorial ANOVA of Contract Framing x Misreporting Opportunity Awareness  
Panel A of this Table presents the descriptive statistics of participants’ responses to the post-experimental questionnaire by condition. Each statement was elicited 
using a 6-point Likert scale with “1” labeled “Strongly Disagree” and “6” labeled “Strongly Agree."  
Panel B of this Table presents a factor analysis on participants’ responses to these statements from a principal component analysis using Varimax rotation.  
Refer to Panel A of this Table for the items.  
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TABLE 7 
Descriptive Statistics of Questionnaire Items Capturing the Entitlement Measure 
 
 
(1) I deserved to receive the full $15 in this experiment. 
  Aware Before Effort   
Aware After 
Effort 
Bonus for Achieving Target 
3.16  2.88 
(1.62)  (1.60) 
n=25  n=24 
    
Penalty for not Achieving Target 
3.96  3.56 
(1.60)  (1.73) 
n=24  n=25 
    (2) I feel entitled to the full $15 in this experiment. 
  Aware Before Effort   
Aware After 
Effort 
Bonus for Achieving Target 
2.72  2.92 
(1.62)  (1.56) 
n=25  n=24 
    
Penalty for not Achieving Target 
3.42  3.2 
(1.64)  (1.47) 
n=24  n=25 
    (3) Entitlement (mean of above measures: [measure 1 + measure 2] / 2) 
  Aware Before Effort   
Aware After 
Effort 
Bonus for Achieving Target 
2.94  2.9 
(1.53)  (1.51) 
n=25  n=24 
    
Penalty for not Achieving Target 
3.67  3.38 
(1.51)  (1.40) 
n=24  n=25  
 
This Table summarizes the two statements used to capture perceptions of entitlement to the incentive amount and 
the descriptive statistics of participant responses to the two statements by condition. Each statement was elicited 
using an 6-point Likert scale with “1” labeled “Strongly Disagree” and “6” labeled “Strongly Agree."  
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TABLE 8 
Entitlement a as a Mediator of Misreporting 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Variance for Effects of Contract Framing and Misreporting Opportunity 
Awareness on Entitlement a  
Factor  Df  
Mean 
Square  F  
 
p-value b 
         
CONTRACT FRAMING c  1  9.2878  4.18  .0436 
MISREPORTING OPPORTUNITY 
AWARENESS d 
 1  .7572  .34  .5606 
FRAMING x AWARENESS  1  .4246  .19  .6629 
Error  97       
Panel B: Analysis of Variance for Effects of Contract Framing, Misreporting Opportunity 
Awareness, & Entitlement on Misreporting Likelihood 
Factor  Df  
Mean 
Square  F  
 
p-value b 
         
ENTITLEMENT a  1  1.0081  5.37  .0227 
CONTRACT FRAMING c  1  .4521  2.41  .1242 
MISREPORTING OPPORTUNITY 
AWARENESS d 
 1  .2982  1.59  .2108 
FRAMING x AWARENESS  1  .0124  .07  .7979 
Error  97       
Panel C: Analysis of Variance for Effects of Contract Framing, Misreporting Opportunity 
Awareness, & Entitlement on Dishonesty 
Factor  Df  
Mean 
Square  F  
 
p-value b 
         
ENTITLEMENT a  1  .8542  8.34  .0048 
CONTRACT FRAMING c  1  .2825  2.76  .1001 
MISREPORTING OPPORTUNITY 
AWARENESS d 
 1  .0647  .63  .4287 
FRAMING x AWARENESS  1  .0001  .00  .9805 
Error  97       
 
a Entitlement is the mean of the two entitlement measures, as shown in Table 7. The mediation analysis follows the 
steps laid out in Baron and Kenny (1986). The coefficient estimates for Contract Framing (showing a negative 
relationship between the Bonus condition and the dependent variables) decreased in absolute value from  
-.0901 to -.0694 for Misreporting Likelihood and from -.0746 to -.0549 for Dishonesty after the mediator was added 
to the model. 
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Table 8 (Cont.) 
b All p-values in this Table are two-tailed.  
c Contract Framing was manipulated between subjects at two levels. Participants were either promised a bonus for 
scoring greater than or equal to 25 or threatened with a penalty for scoring less than 25. 
d Misreporting Opportunity Awareness was manipulated between subjects at two levels. All participants were told, 
"At the end of the official round, the computer will tell you how many questions you answered correctly." The 
Aware Before Effort participants were further told, "You will then be asked to report your score. Your pay will be 
calculated based only on the score you report. If you lie about your score, you will not be caught." The Aware After 
Effort participants were told this as well but only after they had completed the official round task. 
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APPENDIX B: FIGURES  
Figure 1 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
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APPENDIX C: PARTICIPANT RESPONSES 
This appendix lists direct quotations from participants in response to the request that they "Please 
briefly describe why you chose to overstate or not overstate your score." This information was 
solicited at the very beginning of the post-experimental questionnaire.   
 
Participants who misreported gave the following reasons for having misreported: 
 
Bonus - Aware After 
 
1. I only claim what I earned. 
2. By overstating my score I will receive extra bonus. 
3. The incentive of 5 dollars is too great 
4. I chose to overstate because there was only a reward and no penalties for doing so. 
5. I didn't overstate my score because I scored above 25. That made it easy not to lie. 
6. because it appears that you wanted me to 
Bonus - Aware Before 
 
7. I think it might not be hard for many people to score 25 so I think I can lie about my score. 
8. There is pretty limited time for me to finish all those 30 questions. 
9. Questions were boring and incomprehensible. I got bored of the questions and felt entitled to the 
money. I over stated my score as 30 when in reality I got 10. 
Penalty - Aware After 
 
1. Didn't want to get the $5 dollars that I didn't deserve. 
2. I chose to overstate my score because I'm perfectly capable of living with the fact that I lied. This is 
only an experiment, so I felt that there wasn't much of a consequence in this situation as there would 
be in the real world. However, if this were a real life situation where I could actually get in trouble for 
it, I would have told the truth. 
3. Well, to be frank, I don't have $15 so it would be really nice to have $15 instead of having $10. That's 
a whole 33% difference. 
4. I rather not lose the $5 I know is possible to get 
5. Because I forgot to bring cash out for lunch and I think 10 bucks is not enough.. Plus the cost of lying 
here is close to zero. 
6. It is a gloomy Friday morning, and I am sick so I need the extra $5 for medicine. 
7. I do not want to pay for the lab. there are questions that I did not prepare before. so it is reasonable 
that I did not do well, 
8. I chose to overstate because there will be $15 given and I won't get caught on my lies. 
9. I felt guilty to overstate my option, but I want $15 rather than nothing. Also I felt no responsibility 
here. 
10. I overstated my score because $15 is more than $10. I would have overstated even if I was "caught" if 
it meant I got $5 more. 
Penalty - Aware Before 
 
11. I got 20 as my real score but I wanted to overstate a little (by 3 points) because I was running out of 
time / If I was given more time, I am sure I could do better 
12. Overstating the score since I would not be penalized for $5 
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13. I chose to overstate my score because I knew I would be penalized $5 dollars for a lower score. 
14. for additional money 
15. I overstated my score to receive five more dollars. There was a moral penalty for lying about my 
score, but the fact that I am simply in an experiment and not in a real world situation made me feel 
comfortable enough to lie. 
16. It was in my best interest to overstate my score to ensure I was paid the maximum compensation. 
17. I chose to overstate my score to receive more money. 
18. I overstate my score because I don't want to be penalized. I got a score lower than 25. 
Participants who were honest gave the following reasons for having been honest: 
 
Bonus - Aware After 
 
1. I didn't know if I could overstate my score 
2. I never even thought to overstate my score although I would not have just because of my morals that I 
follow. 
3. I knew that I did not earn the additional $5 based on my score. It wouldn't be fair for me to overstate 
my score. 
4. I do not choose to lie, as having additional $5 does not worth me to betray my value. 
5. I chose to not overstate my score because I do not deserve the bonus when I did not achieve the 
required goal. Also, I am an honest person and could not live with that lie on my head. 
6. I chose to be honest because it is not encouraged to lie on something 
7. I chose not to overstate my income because I value integrity.  The extra $5 is not worth it to me to lie 
about my results. 
8. Just to be honest 
9. I just did not wanted to cheat for 5 dollars. 
10. only 5 dollars. probably would have overstated it if it was more than 5 
11. 1. I have a low expectation on my payment. $10 is sufficient for an experiment like this.  / 2. 5 dollar 
bonus isn't that attractive to me  / 3. I choose not to lie if it's unnecessary  / 4. I really suck on 
answering these problem. I kind of give up in the middle because I knew I couldn't finish it one time, 
neither get the 5 dollar bonus. I am happy with $10 
12. I did not overstate because what's $5 dollars really?? 
13. I choose not to overstate my score because I was concerned I would get caught. Honestly it wasn't 
worth losing everything over an extra $5. I was happy with the $10 and decided to keep just that 
considering I didn't actually answer all of the questions. 
14. I did not feel I earned the adequate score to be compensated an extra $5. Also, the baseline $10 for 20 
minutes of work was very adequate in my opinion. 
15. I thought that my score would be reported along with what I actually reported, would be easy to see 
my lie. 
16. As it was computerized, I figured the researcher would be able to see my actual score versus the score 
that I reported. 
17. In case the scores were being monitored by the individual conducting the study. 
18. the time is limited and there is no time for me to think if the question is right or wrong. 
Bonus - Aware Before 
 
19. Since I did not know about the option to overstate my score, I did not overstate my score. 
20. I did not know I could and I kind of though about it but I did not want to. 
21. I did not overstate my score because I did not know I could. 
22. I didn't overstate my score because I thought I should be honest and truthful 
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23. I decided not to overstate my score because I choose to be honest and have integrity. As a business 
student, I understand the temptations there are to lie, but I wanted to keep my integrity because of my 
personal morals. 
24. i figured honesty is best 
25. Even though the study stated that we would be paid for overstating, I knew I would feel guilty later 
on. 
26. I felt that it was right to tell the truth about my score even though I could have lied to get the bonus. 
27. This study, like anything else, is a representation of who I am as a person. I pride myself on my own 
integrity and it was abundantly clear that overstating my results would not be the right thing to do. 
28. I chose not to overstate because I did not feel it was right. 
29. Just wanted to tell the truth 
30. I just did not think lying about my score was the correct option to choose. If this survey was to assess 
whether or not I would get a job that was suitable for my skill set, I could lie and get the job, but I 
will perform horribly later in my job and get fired regardless. 
31. it felt wrong to overstate 
32. I value morals and honesty. 
33. I did not achieve a score of 25, and I would feel guilty if I overstated my score. I am not happy with 
myself that I wasn't able to get a score of 25, and I would love to see what I got wrong, but I would 
feel bad about myself if I lied about achieving something that I wasn't able to. 
34. I chose not to overstate my score because I believe I should receive the compensation I earned and 
receiving $15 when I only earned $10 is not something I feel comfortable doing. Lying to receive an 
extra five bucks just isn't worth it to me. 
35. Because I really did bad on the research questions, and I am very ashamed about that. I want to write 
down the actual score I got to kind notice myself how bad I did. Besides, I already got the $10, no 
matter what score I got. 
36. I didn't know the consequence of overstating my score. Even if I did, I feel that the protector would 
have a way to figure out if I overstate it or not, so I think it's better to not falsify it. 
37. I didn't overstate my score because I did not earn the $5 reward.  Although lying for $5 didn't seem 
like that big of a deal, I was also concerned that I might get caught. 
38. I didn't know the meanings of many words in the questions since I am not a native-speaker of 
English. After I completing the practice round, I have already know it is impossible for me to get at 
least 25 questions correct in 15 minutes without using dictionary. I just randomly pick the choices for 
answering the questions. 
39. [no response] 
40. [no response]  
Penalty - Aware After 
 
1. I did not know about the option to overstate my score. I thought the computer new what it was. 
2. I chose not to overstate my score simply because this information is valuable to someone and I would 
not want another person to mess up my research if I was conducting this survey. 
3. I did not think about overstate my score and I think I should be honest on this experiment. 
4. I choose not overstate my score, since it is not necessary to overstate my score. Just tell the real score. 
Be integrity. 
5. I am honest 
6. I didn't answer 25 questions correctly so I didn't want to cheat or lie just to make an extra $5.  I am 
already making $10, and I believe it was best to take it with honesty. 
7. I did not overstate my score because I didn't want to lie. I wanted to earn the extra $5 through my own 
intelligence and not by cheating. 
8. I'm an honest person 
9. I chose to not overstate my score because I am a honest person in general. 
 57 
10. I chose not to overstate my scores because I would feel like it was stealing and would feel guilty 
about it.  The rules clearly stated how much compensation I would receive depending on the amount 
of questions I answered. 
11. It was the right thing to do. 
12. Although lying did not matter, I feel like it was hard for me to lie because it felt like I was taking a 
standardized test. Especially because money was on the line, I further felt guilty and did not lie. 
13. I did not think that 5 dollars was worth it. 
14. I chose not to overstate my score because I felt like it wasn't a big deal to have to lie to get an extra 
$5. I would be getting $10 and I am satisfied enough by that not to have to lie to get more. 
15. Not overstate. Because I don't think that the computer sill not know my actual scores. And maybe if I 
overstate, the computer or the experiment instructor will know. 
Penalty - Aware Before 
 
16. I chose not to overstate my score because I did not know that I could overstate it. Furthermore, I did 
not want to give false information. 
17. I choose to not overstate my score because it is pretty obvious that it is very tough to get a 25 out of 
30 on this assessment. 
18. Because I am honesty. 
19. I am a honest person, and money, for me are not that important 
20. I didn't choose to overstate my score because its wrong and I would feel guilty for taking the extra 5 
dollars I didn't earn 
21. I chose not to overstate my score because that would have been unethical. It never even crossed my 
mind to do so. 
22. I chose to not overstate my score because I believe that honesty is extremely important and is a value 
that I try to maintain. 
23. I don't really need the extra $5, and I'm sure it could be used to better help the program. 
24. Integrity. And I believe if I tell the truth, good luck will come to me. 
25. I  chose not to overstate my score because that would be a lie. 
26. I don't think it's worth it to lie for 5 dollars. You can make 5 dollars easily, but having the burden to 
know that you lied just isn't something I want to experience. 
27. I didn't have enough incentive to overstate and I would rather just tell the truth. 
28. I chose not to overstate because I was still rewarded for answering the questions.  I just did not see the 
advantages to getting compensated a little more (overstating) but having to lie. 
29. I chose not to overstate my score because I am content with receiving the $10 base pay. It would be 
nice to receive $5 more by overstating my score, but I wouldn't feel like I deserved it. 
30. I chose not to overstate because my official score was far lower than the target score, thus felt like 
putting higher risk by manipulating the score. If the score were close to the target score, I may have 
changed my score, but since it wasn't, I decided that honesty would play better. Also by overstating 
much, there is more risk of getting caught. 
31. I was not cnofident [sic] 
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APPENDIX D: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT  
 Each page that follows represents a separate page/screen that was viewed by participants on a 
computer. At the bottom of each page was a button for participants to click "Next" when they 
were ready to proceed to the next screen. They were informed that they would be unable to 
return to previous screens after clicking this button. Any information presented within brackets 
was not shown to participants but is listed here when necessary to identify which treatment 
observed the page (e.g., [BONUS] reflects that participants in the bonus conditions were shown 
the information listed). 
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DO NOT TOUCH THE COMPUTER UNTIL INSTRUCTED BY PROCTOR     
Once the experiment begins, use the computer ONLY to participate in the experiment--no 
opening other programs or browsing the Internet.  
 
Thank you! :) 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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Instructions 
 
In this experiment, you will be asked to answer a set of questions from each of the following 
categories: critical reasoning, sentence completion, and sentence correction. These questions are 
difficult, and your pay will depend on your score. The details of your compensation will be 
provided prior to answering the questions.  
 
Once you have finished answering the questions, the computer will calculate your score as the 
number of questions you answered correctly. You will then proceed to the final stage of the 
experiment.  
 
Prior to beginning the question task, you will complete a short practice round where the 
difficulty of the questions is comparable to what you will face in the official round. Your score in 
the practice round will NOT affect your pay.  
 
NO PHONES, INTERNET BROWSING, ETC. ARE ALLOWED FOR THE DURATION OF 
THE EXPERIMENT.   
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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Practice Round 
 
Compensation:  
 
Your pay will NOT be affected by this round.  
 
At the end of the practice round, the computer will tell you how many questions you answered 
correctly. 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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Practice Round 
 
Effort:  
 
You will be given 3 questions this round. You will have up to 1 minute and 30 seconds to answer 
these 3 questions. However, you may click submit at any point, whether you have answered the 
questions or not, to proceed to the next stage of the experiment.  
 
If you spend more time on the questions, it may help you answer more questions correctly.     
If you spend less time on the questions, you will be able to complete the experiment more 
quickly and you can leave sooner. 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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Critical Reasoning      
 
The following section tests critical reasoning. After reading the following question, please select 
the best answer among the choices that follow. 
 
1.) Beautiful beaches attract people, no doubt about it.  Just look at this city’s beautiful beaches, 
which are among the most overcrowded beaches in the state.  
 
Which of the following exhibits a pattern of reasoning most similar to the one exhibited in the 
argument above? 
 a. Moose and bear usually appear at the same drinking hole at the same time of day.  
Therefore, moose and bear must grow thirsty at about the same time. 
 b. Children who are scolded severely tend to misbehave more often than other children.  
Hence, if a child is not scolded severely that child is less likely to misbehave. 
 c. This software program helps increase the work efficiency of its users.  As a result, these 
users have more free time for other activities. 
 d. During warm weather, my dog suffers from fleas more so than during cooler weather.  
Therefore, fleas must thrive in a warm environment. 
 e. Pesticides are known to cause anemia in some people.  However, most anemic people live 
in regions where pesticides are not commonly used. 
 
Sentence Completion      
 
The sentence below has one or two blanks, with each blank indicating that something has been 
omitted. Beneath the sentence are five words or sets of words labeled (a) through (e).  Select the 
word or set of words that, when inserted in the sentence, best fits the meaning of the sentence as 
a whole. 
 
2.)   His ------ was so limitless that it bordered on recklessness, for he gave more to charity than 
he could really afford. 
 a. amicability 
 b. inexorableness 
 c. frivolity 
 d. munificence 
 e. venerability 
 
Sentence Correction      
 
The following section tests correctness and effectiveness of expression. Part of the sentence or 
the entire sentence is underlined; beneath the sentence are five ways of phrasing the underlined 
material. Choice (a) repeats the original phrasing; the other four choices are different. If you 
think the original phrasing produces a better sentence than any of the other alternatives, select 
choice (a); if not, select one of the other choices.  
 
In making your selection, follow the requirements of standard written English. That is, pay 
attention to grammar, choice of words, sentence construction, and punctuation. Your selection 
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should result in the most effective sentence – clear and precise, without awkwardness or 
ambiguity. 
 
3.) After shopping all day in crowded department stores, Kathy and Erica were as tired as if 
running a marathon. 
 a. if running 
 b. having run 
 c. if from running 
 d. if they had run 
 e. if they would have run 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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Practice Round Results  
 
The highest possible score for the practice round was 3. You answered <insert practice round 
score> question(s) correctly in this round.  
 
Your score: <insert practice round score> 
 
Your pay was NOT affected by this practice round. You have now completed the practice round. 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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[BONUS/BEFORE TREATMENT] 
 
OFFICIAL Round 
 
Compensation:     
 
You will be paid a salary of $10 for your work in this experiment. In addition, you will receive a 
$5 BONUS if your score shows you answered at least 25 of the 30 questions correctly in the 
Official Round. 
 
At the end of the official round, the computer will tell you how many questions you answered 
correctly. You will then be asked to report your score. Your pay will be calculated based only on 
the score you report. If you lie about your score, you will not be caught. 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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[BONUS/AFTER TREATMENT] 
 
OFFICIAL Round 
 
Compensation: 
 
You will be paid a salary of $10 for your work in this experiment. In addition, you will receive a 
$5 BONUS if your score shows you answered at least 25 of the 30 questions correctly in 
the Official Round. 
 
At the end of the official round, the computer will tell you how many questions you answered 
correctly. 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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[PENALTY/BEFORE TREATMENT] 
 
OFFICIAL Round 
 
Compensation: 
 
You will be paid a salary of $15 for your work in this experiment. However, you will be charged 
a $5 PENALTY if your score does not show you answered at least 25 of the 30 questions 
correctly in the Official Round. 
 
At the end of the official round, the computer will tell you how many questions you answered 
correctly. You will then be asked to report your score. Your pay will be calculated based only on 
the score you report. If you lie about your score, you will not be caught. 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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[PENALTY/AFTER TREATMENT] 
 
OFFICIAL Round 
 
Compensation: 
 
You will be paid a salary of $15 for your work in this experiment. However, you will be charged 
a $5 PENALTY if your score does not show you answered at least 25 of the 30 questions 
correctly in the Official Round. 
 
At the end of the official round, the computer will tell you how many questions you answered 
correctly. 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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OFFICIAL Round 
 
Effort:      
 
You will be given 30 questions this round. You will have up to 15 minutes to answer these 30 
questions. However, you may click submit at any point, whether you have answered the 
questions or not, to proceed to the next stage of the experiment.     
 
If you spend more time on the questions, it may help you answer more questions correctly.   
If you spend less time on the questions, you will be able to complete the experiment more 
quickly and you can leave sooner. 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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Critical Reasoning      
 
The following section tests critical reasoning. After reading the following questions, please select 
the best answer among the choices that follow. 
 
1.) Experts studying patterns of shark attacks on humans have noted that attacks tend to diminish 
when the water temperature drops below 65 degrees Fahrenheit.  Until recently, researchers 
believed this was because sharks prefer warmer water, and thus are present in fewer numbers in 
colder water.  However, new research shows that sharks are present in equal numbers in cold and 
warm water. Which of the following, if true, best explains the apparent paradox? 
 a. In general, humans prefer warm water. 
 b. Sharks’ keen sense of smell is enhanced in cold water. 
 c. In the Pacific, shark attacks tend to occur more frequently in the daytime. 
 d. Of the more than 200 types of sharks present in the ocean, only three attack humans. 
 e. The average temperature of the earth’s ocean is 55 degrees. 
 
2.) Scientists today accept that the increased severity of hurricanes in the last 10 years has been 
the result of warmer water in the Caribbean, which “feed” the storms as they pass over it by a 
mechanism not yet completely understood.  Thus, these severe hurricanes are yet more evidence 
of global warming.  Which of the following, if true, would most strengthen the argument above? 
 a. Accurate statistics on the warming of the earth do not go back more than 100 years. 
 b. Scientists have not discovered a new undersea current, fueled by an undersea volcano, 
which could have funneled warmer water into the Caribbean. 
 c. The artic ice caps have been losing three feet of circumference each year for the past five 
years. 
 d. A new modeling computer program projects that the severity of hurricanes will increase 
over the next 10 years. 
 e. Some scientists believe they will soon prove that the mechanism by which a storm picks 
up energy from warm water is based on convection. 
 
3.)   A pharmaceutical company claims that its new drug promotes learning in children.  To back 
up its claims, the company points to a study of 300 children who were given the drug, along with 
a control group of 300 children who were given a placebo.  The 300 children who were given the 
drug reported that they were able to retain new information much more easily. Which of the 
following statements, if true, would most tend to weaken the claims of the pharmaceutical 
company? 
 a. The 300 children in the control group also reported that they were able to retain new 
information much more easily. 
 b. The drug has also been shown to prevent common skin rashes. 
 c. The drug has been proven to have severe side effects. 
 d. The children in the study were not given any other medications during the study. 
 e. The children who were given the drug did better on cognitive measurement tests after the 
drug therapy than before. 
 
4.)   In order to understand the dangers of the current real-estate bubble in Country Y, one has 
only to look to the real-estate bubble of the last decade in Country Z.  In that country, incautious 
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investors used the inflated value of their real estate as collateral in risky margin loans.  When the 
real-estate market collapsed, many investors went bankrupt, creating a major recession.  Country 
Y is in real danger of a similar recession if more-stringent laws restricting margin loans are not 
enacted promptly.  
 
The answer to which of the following questions would be most useful in evaluating the 
significance of the author’s claims? 
 a. Was the real estate in Country Z located principally in rural areas or was it located in more 
urban communities? 
 b. Could the bankruptcies in Country Z have been prevented by a private bailout plan by the 
nation’s banks? 
 c. Does Country Y currently have any laws on its books regarding margin loans? 
 d. Are there business ties and connections between Country Y and Country Z? 
 e. Were there other factors in the case of Country Y that would make the comparison with 
Country Z less meaningful? 
 
5.)   A prolonged period of low mortgage rates resulted in a period of the most robust home sales 
ever.  At the same time, the average sale price of the resale homes actually dropped, when 
adjusted for inflation. Which of the following, if true, would explain the apparent contradiction 
between the robust home sales and the drop in the average sale price of resale homes? 
 a. The inflation rate during this period exceeded the increase in the average salary, thus 
preventing many buyers from securing mortgages. 
 b. Resale homes represent the best value on the real estate market. 
 c. Without the adjustment for inflation, the price of resale homes actually increased by a very 
slight amount. 
 d. The decrease in mortgage rates was accompanied by a widening of the types of mortgages 
from which borrowers could choose. 
 e. The increase in home sales was due entirely to an increase in the sale of new homes. 
 
6.)   Luis is taller than Rei.  Kiko is taller than Marcus.  Therefore, Kiko is taller than Rei.  
 
The conclusion drawn above is not supported by the argument; however, the addition of one 
additional piece of information would make the conclusion logically sound.  All of the following 
could be the additional piece of information EXCEPT: 
 a. Kiko is taller than Luis. 
 b. Luis is taller than Marcus. 
 c. Luis and Marcus are the same height. 
 d. Marcus and Rei are the same height. 
 e. Marcus is taller than Rei. 
 
7.)   It is the policy of SubStop Sandwiches to give discretionary raises only to employees who 
demonstrate a strong commitment to their jobs and have worked at SubStop for more than six 
months.  However, a state labor law requires SubStop to provide annual cost-of-living raises to 
all employees who have been continuously employed for at least six months.  Last year, SubStop 
complied fully with its own policy and with the state’s labor laws.  Yet, 2-and only 2-of SubStop 
Sandwiches’ 8 employees received any wage raise whatsoever last year. If the information 
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provided is true, which of the following must on the basis of it also be true about SubStop last 
year? 
 a.   Two of its employees demonstrated a strong commitment to their jobs. 
 b.   None of its employees received a discretionary raise. 
 c.   Six of its employees failed to demonstrate a strong commitment to their jobs. 
 d.   Two of its employees worked at SubStop continuously for at least six months. 
 e.   It claimed to provide wage raises in compliance with the State’s labor law but in fact did 
not. 
 
8.)   Everyone agrees that current licensing requirements for child-care facilities are reasonably 
necessary to ensure public safety.  Current licensing requirements for handgun ownership are far 
less stringent than those for operating child-care facilities.  Yet the recent flurry of school 
shootings by young children using their parents’ handguns shows that handgun ownership poses 
a significant potential threat to public safety. The author is arguing that: 
 a.   The recent school shootings would not have occurred were it not for lenient handgun 
ownership laws. 
 b.   Parents of young children should not be allowed to own handguns. 
 c.   The legal requirements for obtaining a license for operating a child-care facility are more 
stringent than those for handgun ownership. 
 d.   Unlicensed child-care and unlicensed handgun ownership both pose a potential threat to 
public safety. 
 e.   It would be reasonable to impose more stringent requirements for handgun ownership. 
 
Sentence Completion          
                
Each sentence below has one or two blanks, with each blank indicating that something has been 
omitted. Beneath the sentence are five words or sets of words labeled (a) through (e).  Select the 
word or set of words that, when inserted in the sentence, best fits the meaning of the sentence as 
a whole. 
 
9.)   Alex is so ------ that it is nearly impossible to offer him constructive criticism without him 
taking it personally and acting defensively. 
 a. cerebral 
 b. obdurate 
 c. sensitive 
 d. pretentious 
 e. enervated 
 
10.)   Many artists seem to be seeking to express what they consider to be ------, or 
incommunicable by any other means. 
 a. ineffable 
 b. mundane 
 c. onerous 
 d. incisive 
 e. auspicious 
 
 74 
11.)   Because Ben had been known for being ------ in college, his former classmates were 
surprised to hear that his colleagues at work found him rather lazy. 
 a. indiscriminate 
 b. enigmatic 
 c. vicarious 
 d. rancorous 
 e. assiduous 
 
12.)   The teacher tried to negotiate an agreement between the quarreling students but felt ------ 
about the outcome because the students refused to compromise. 
 a. cordial 
 b. dubious 
 c. benevolent 
 d. biased 
 e. prophetic 
 
13.)   Since the mid-eighteenth century, there has been much ------ between the cultures of 
France and Germany despite the frequent ------ between those two countries. 
 a. communication…alliances 
 b. hatred…opposition 
 c. interaction…enmity 
 d. antagonism…misunderstandings 
 e. hostility…alienation 
 
14.)   Developmental psychologists often cite yelling at children as ------ and a poor way to help 
them learn. 
 a. benign 
 b. diagnostic 
 c. inefficacious 
 d. discretionary 
 e. therapeutic 
 
15.)   The young professional’s boss praised her ------ nature and stated that she seemed to have 
an unconquerable positive spirit. 
 a. morose 
 b. opulent 
 c. indomitable 
 d. lithe 
 e. ephemeral 
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16.)   A male green anole lizard views his territory as ------ and often instigates confrontations 
with any male of his species that may wander within its boundaries. 
 a. dissipated 
 b. circuitous 
 c. unparalleled 
 d. inviolable 
 e. mandated 
 
17.)   ------ is a common theme in Greek tragedies and mythology, whose stories often featured 
protagonists suffering from exaggerated pride and subsequently being punished by the gods for 
it. 
 a. Obstinacy 
 b. Hubris 
 c. Impetuosity 
 d. Valor 
 e. Callousness 
 
18.)    The newly found eyewitness filled in many of the gaps in the case, providing certainty 
where before there had been a ------ of evidence. 
 a. spate 
 b. revision 
 c. dearth 
 d. dispersal 
 e. consensus 
 
19.)   The senators decided to ------ the most contentious bill and focus instead on passing 
another law on which it was easier to reach a suitable ------. 
 a. table…consensus 
 b. enact…opinion 
 c. berate…decision 
 d. proclaim…agreement 
 e. endorse…compromise 
 
Sentence Correction      
 
The following section tests correctness and effectiveness of expression. Part of each sentence or 
the entire sentence is underlined; beneath each sentence are five ways of phrasing the underlined 
material. Choice (a) repeats the original phrasing; the other four choices are different. If you 
think the original phrasing produces a better sentence than any of the other alternatives, select 
choice (a); if not, select one of the other choices.  
 
In making your selection, follow the requirements of standard written English. That is, pay 
attention to grammar, choice of words, sentence construction, and punctuation. Your selection 
should result in the most effective sentence – clear and precise, without awkwardness or 
ambiguity. 
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20.)   Although dismissed by salon attendees for its subject matter, most artists viewed Manet’s 
Olympia as a groundbreaking work. 
 a. most artists viewed Manet’s Olympia as a groundbreaking work 
 b. most artists viewed Manet’s Olympia to be a groundbreaking work 
 c. a groundbreaking work was what most artists viewed Manet’s Olympia as 
 d. Manet’s Olympia was viewed by most artists as a groundbreaking work 
 e. Manet’s Olympia, a groundbreaking work in the view of most artists 
 
21.)   Analysts say that the companies’ projected annual profit, which is $10 million less than 
expected and $15 million less than the previous year, is a severe disappointment to 
stockholders.   
 a. which is $10 million less than expected and $15 million less than 
 b. estimated $10 million lower than expected while having fallen $15 million from 
 c. with an amount $10 million less than expected as well as $15 million less than that of 
 d. $10 million less than expected, and it amounts to $15 million less than 
 e.   being $10 million less than expected and $15 million less than measured from 
 
22.)   Though strongly dependent on the Moscow government for regulations and laws while 
former Soviet countries supply Kaliningrad with business, as a city it remains geographically 
independent of both. 
 a. laws while former Soviet countries supply Kaliningrad with business, as a city it remains 
 b. laws and on business by former Soviet countries, Kaliningrad, a city 
 c. laws and on former Soviet countries for business, Kaliningrad is a city 
 d. laws, former Soviet countries supply Kaliningrad with business, but it is a city 
 e. laws, former Soviet countries supply Kaliningrad with business, while it remains a city 
 
23.)   The secretary of state’s speech, detailing foreign policy in this hemisphere and beyond and 
setting out a plan for peace in the region, became a classic of modern statesmanship. 
 a. The secretary of state’s speech, detailing foreign policy in this hemisphere and beyond and 
setting out a plan for peace in the region, 
 b. Detailing foreign policy in this hemisphere and beyond, the secretary of state’s speech 
setting out a plan for peace in the region, it also 
 c. With details of foreign policy in this hemisphere and beyond and setting out a plan for 
peace in the region, the secretary of state’s speech 
 d. The secretary of state’s speech with its detailing of foreign policy in this hemisphere and 
beyond and setting out a plan for peace in the region, 
 e. Although the secretary of state’s speech detailed foreign policy in this hemisphere and 
beyond and also set out a plan for peace in the region, 
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24.)   In the city, by just walking outside or taking the subway, new people and events can be 
seen. 
 a. new people and events can be seen 
 b. seeing new people and events 
 c. new people and events being seen 
 d. one can see new people and events 
 e. it is new people and events that can be seen 
 
25.)   Some fans believe that in the next Olympics, Michael Phelps will not only win seven gold 
swimming medals, but also many world records will be claimed. 
 a. Michael Phelps will not only win seven gold swimming medals, but also many world 
records will be claimed 
 b. Michael Phelps will win not only seven gold swimming medals, but will claim many 
world records as well 
 c. Michael Phelps will not only win seven gold swimming medals, but also claim many 
world records 
 d. Michael Phelps will not only win seven gold swimming medals, but claim many world 
records in addition 
 e. Michael Phelps will not only win seven gold swimming medals, but he will claim many 
world records also 
 
26.)   Hauling the laundry basket up the fifth flight of stairs, exhaustion forced Maria to stop and 
sit down on the landing for a moment. 
 a. exhaustion forced Maria to stop and sit down 
 b. exhaustion was what forced Maria to stop and sit down 
 c. it was exhaustion that forced Maria to stop and sit down 
 d. Maria, forced by exhaustion to stop and sit down 
 e. Maria was forced by exhaustion to stop and sit down 
 
27.)   People who have low motivation or are not at least moderately intelligent are not likely to 
make it as international journalists. 
 a. have low motivation or are not at least moderately intelligent 
 b. has either low motivation or not intelligence in at least moderate amounts 
 c. are not highly motivated or who don’t have at least moderate intelligence instead 
 d. are not highly motivated or at least moderately intelligent 
 e. has low motivation or else at least moderate amounts of intelligence 
 
28.)   Although Mike is very much interested in music, he does not play an instrument and has 
never attended a musical. 
 a. he does not play an instrument and has never attended a musical 
 b. it is without being able to play an instrument or having attended a musical 
 c. he does not play an instrument and has never seen it 
 d. he does not play an instrument nor has he ever seen it 
 e. it is without playing an instrument nor having seen it 
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29.)   Having Sam Erlich as their leader and the increasing athletic ability of the team helped to 
bring about a victorious era for track and field at Bartle High School. 
 a. Having Sam Erlich as their leader 
 b. Having the leadership of Sam Erlich’s 
 c. Sam Erlich as their leader 
 d. To be led by Sam Erlich 
 e. The leadership of Sam Erlich 
 
30.)   The issue the economists considered, which was whether a tax decrease will cause an 
increase in consumer spending or simply an increase in consumer savings. 
 a. considered, which was whether a tax decrease will cause an increase 
 b. considered was if they would decrease taxes would this cause an increase 
 c. considered was that a decrease of taxes would result in an increased 
 d. considered was will decreasing taxes mean an increase 
 e. considered was whether a tax decrease would cause an increase 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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[BONUS TREATMENTS]  
 
Official Round Results  
 
 The highest possible score for the official round was 30. You answered <insert actual score> 
question(s) correctly in this round. Your score: <insert actual score>  
 
The previous number represents your actual score for this period. However, your pay will be 
calculated based only on the score you report.  
 
If you choose to lie about your score, you will not be caught. However, you will have to live with 
the knowledge that you chose to lie.    
 
Remember: You will be paid a salary of $10 for your work in this experiment. In addition, you 
will receive a $5 BONUS if your score shows you answered at least 25 of the 30 questions 
correctly in the Official Round.  
 
Please report your score here: ____ 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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[PENALTY TREATMENTS]  
 
Official Round Results  
 
 The highest possible score for the official round was 30. You answered <insert actual score> 
question(s) correctly in this round. Your score: <insert actual score>  
 
The previous number represents your actual score for this period. However, your pay will be 
calculated based only on the score you report.  
 
If you choose to lie about your score, you will not be caught. However, you will have to live with 
the knowledge that you chose to lie.    
 
Remember: You will be paid a salary of $15 for your work in this experiment. However, you 
will be charged a $5 PENALTY if your score does not show you answered at least 25 of the 30 
questions correctly in the Official Round. 
 
Please report your score here: ____ 
 
***END SCREEN***  
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Your final compensation for this experiment is <insert value based on reported score>.  
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
 
Please choose the answer that BEST represents your compensation structure: 
 If I reported scoring less than the target score of 25, I would be penalized by $5. 
 If I reported scoring at least the target score of 25, I would receive a bonus of $5. 
 
Please choose the answer that BEST represents your situation: 
 I knew about the option to overstate my score BEFORE I answered the official round 
questions. 
 I didn't know about the option to overstate my score until AFTER I answered the official 
round questions. 
 
Please briefly describe why you chose to overstate or not overstate your score:    ____________ 
 
Please estimate the percentage of participants in this experiment that you believe overstated their 
scores:  
______ Participants who overstated score: 
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Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: 
 strongly 
disagree 
disagree slightly 
disagree 
slightly 
agree 
agree strongly 
agree 
Overstating one's performance is wrong. 
             
Not working as hard as you can is wrong.             
 
My choices in this experiment were ethical.             
 
I was honest in this experiment.             
 
I deserved to receive the full $15 in this 
experiment. 
            
 
I feel entitled to the full $15 in this 
experiment. 
            
 
My money was stolen.             
 
My money would have been stolen if I 
hadn't misreported my score. 
            
 
Prior to answering the questions in the 
Official Round, I believed I could achieve 
the target score of 25. 
            
 
The target score for the Official Round was 
fair. 
            
 
The way I expect to be paid is fair.             
 
I was treated fairly in this experiment.             
 
I was treated well in this experiment.             
 
I tried my hardest in this experiment.             
 
I didn't try as hard to answer the questions 
correctly because I knew I could just 
overstate my score if I didn't do well. 
            
 
I didn't try as hard to answer the questions             
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correctly because I had already decided to 
overstate my score. 
 
 
Do you regret your decision to overstate your score? 
 Yes, I regret overstating my score. 
 No, I do not regret overstating my score. 
 Not applicable (I did not overstate my score) 
 
Do you regret your decision to NOT overstate your score? 
 Yes, I regret NOT overstating my score. 
 No, I do not regret NOT overstating my score. 
 Not applicable (I overstated my score) 
 
Please select your gender:    
 Male 
 Female 
 
Are you an international student or a citizen of the U.S.? 
 International student 
 Citizen of the U.S. 
 
Do you consider English your second language? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Please select your school year: 
 Freshman 
 Sophomore 
 Junior 
 Senior 
 Grad student 
 
Are you a James Scholar? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Have you taken BUS101? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Do you have anything else you'd like to tell us? 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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DEBRIEFING     
 
Thank you for your participation in today’s study. This study examines how incentive schemes 
affect the tendency to be unethical, specifically the tendency to misreport one's performance as 
well as how the option to commit misconduct affects effort decisions. Hopefully you resisted the 
urge to lie, even though lying could have benefited you financially, as misreporting is wrong.  
 
All the information collected in today’s study will be confidential, and there will be no way of 
identifying your responses in the data archive. This research is not interested in any one 
individual’s responses but looks at the general patterns that emerge when the data are aggregated 
together.  
 
Your participation today is appreciated and will help researchers discover more ways of 
encouraging ethical behavior.  Please do not discuss the nature of the study with others who may 
later participate in it, as this could affect the validity of the research conclusions.  
 
If you have any questions or concerns, you are welcome to talk with Jennifer Nichol 
(jnichol@illinois.edu). If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study 
or any concerns or complaints, please contact the University of Illinois Office for the Protection 
of Research Subjects at 217-333-2670 (collect calls will be accepted if you identify yourself as a 
research participant) or via email at irb@illinois.edu.  
 
THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION.  
 
Please continue to the next and final page of the experiment, where you will view the total 
compensation you have earned. 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
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Your final compensation for this experiment is <insert amount earned>. Please raise your hand 
and the proctor will come and pay you the amount shown on this screen.     
 
The proctor MUST view this screen or YOU WILL ONLY BE PAID THE MINIMUM OF $10. 
 
***END SCREEN*** 
 
